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SOCIAL COSTS OF THE INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF THE EU 
FUNDS FOR BULGARIA 
 
Shteryo Nozharov 
 
 
Abstract: The study identifies and defines the social costs of the inefficient 
management of EU funds for Bulgaria. It is analyzed the last due programme period 
(2007-2015) and its prolongation. As methodology of the research the V4 BM model 
of Al-Debei and Avison (2010) which has not been used for analysis of EU funds 
management for cohesion policy in the public sector, is applied. In this way its 
potential for application in this field is tested. The concept of the study could be 
successfully used for analysis of the social costs of inefficient management of EU 
funds in other member-states.  
 
JEL Codes: F15, H43, O21 
Keywords: social costs, V4 BM model, absorption of EU funds 
 
 
Introduction 
Lessons learned from the previous programme period 2007-2013 in the 
absorption of EU funds for Bulgaria are of great importance for the successful 
fulfilment of the new programme period 2014-2020. 
 Our country is still far from the pre-crisis period growth rates of 7% per year 
(2004-2007) compared to 3.5% for 2015.[1] Its economy is to a large extent related to 
and dependant on the EU grants, mainly for technology innovations and public 
infrastructure construction, as well as for balancing the aggregate demand of cash 
flows, related to the fulfillment of projects by Bulgarian companies, their turnovers 
and wages.  
That is why, it is very important the EU funds absorption to be accomplished in 
an efficient way in order better competitiveness and better living standards for society 
to be achieved.  
The main objective of the research is to identify and define the social costs, 
caused by the inefficient management and absorption of the EU funds for Bulgaria. 
Such kind of analysis could be of great importance for the applying countries for EU 
membership like FYROM, Turkey and Serbia in order much more efficient structuring 
and design of the systems for EU funds management, including the pre-accession 
programmes to be achieved.  
The thesis of the current study is that the present model, concerning the 
reporting of EU funds absorption for Bulgaria does not give information for the social 
costs caused by its ineffectiveness, which fact hinders its optimization and the public 
control over this kind of activity and needs changes. 
The object of the analysis is the management system of the EU funds for 
Bulgaria and the subject is the functional and structural correlations of the existing 
model for management of the system and its main indicators. 
In methodological aspect, by testing the potential of V4 BM model of Al-Debei 
and Avison (2010) for analysis of the EU funds management for cohesion policy in 
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the public sector, will be identified the real absorption of EU funds for Bulgaria.[2]  
The identification of social costs as a result of the inefficient EU funds management 
and absorption for Bulgaria will be made by means of descriptive analysis.  
For some of the calculations, the model of I.Paliova, T.Lybek (2014) will be 
applied. [3]   
The information provision of the study is mainly based on public databases such 
as statistical data, officially published by the national government and EC.  
The restrictive conditions of the study result from the format of the research – a 
conference paper and that is why the analysis will be indicative.  
The study covers the funding through the EU cohesion and structural funds. 
Funding through Agricultural and Fisheries Funds is not examined in the research. 
Such activities that could not be finished till the end of 2015 will be funded by the 
beneficiaries and they are also not covered by the research. Phase funding gives 
opportunities single phases of relevant projects to be funded by the new programme 
period but this topic is not examined in the current study.  
 
 
1. Application of the V4 BM model in reporting the real absorption of EU 
funds (for Bulgaria) 
The application of V4 BM model of Al-Debei and Avison (2010) when reporting 
real absorption of EU funds is a way through which business-modeling could be 
successfully used in public sector analysis. Specifically for this model, in the literature 
review, no publication related to the application of the model in public sector analysis, 
especially in the field of EU funds absorption was found.  
Although business models are oriented towards better opportunities for 
companies ‘profit maximization and their application in the public sector aims better 
public goods provision and society welfare, their usage as a whole is directed 
towards better effectiveness of each organization. That is why, these models could 
be applied in the public sector analysis while studying its specifics compared to the 
private sector.  
Another example of a business-model, used for analysis of the public sector is 
McKinsey 7S Framework - Waterman, R. H., Peters, T. J., & Phillips, J. R. (1980).[4]  
It is successfully used for studying the effective management of EU funds by Sht. 
Nozharov (2014).[5]   
V4 BM model has four main dimensions: Value Proposition, Value Architecture, 
Value Network and Value Finance, including many elements. The current study will 
consecutively focus on each dimension as the accent will be put on the failures.  
The main organization on which the model will be tested is the Bulgarian 
government and more specifically those structures which are occupied with the 
management and absorption of the EU funds for Bulgaria.  
 
A. Value Proposition 
Bulgaria received 3.8% of the total EU funds (175.9 billion. Euros) for the period 
2007-2013 (KPMG, 2016).[6] The funding of 6.7 billion. Euros for Bulgaria is 
allocated into 7 operational programmes in the European structural and cohesion 
funds (ERDF, CF, ESF).[7]     
The main objectives of the EU grants are cohesion and removing the gaps in 
socio-economic perspective with the other member-states as well as the negative 
effects of the global economic crisis. In this regard as Value Proposition in this case 
will be taken the public goods, which are produced with the help of EU funds and 
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whose main objective is better living standards and effects for economy and 
convergence to be achieved.  
The main failures which could be identified in this field are the following:  
First of all, shifting the accent from quality public goods provision in Bulgaria to 
maximum absorption of the EU funds. In this way the public authorities shift the 
public attention from quality of the final product (e.g. efficient functioning of a local 
wastewater treatment plant) to the sum for the construction of the plant. In this way 
some paradoxes raise. In relation to the example mentioned, in Operational 
programme “Environment” many times the public infrastructure is resized in order 
maximum money from the funds to be absorbed, which leads to inability the 
operational costs to be covered in the future and not sufficiently working of the 
infrastructure. Similar case is the constructed local wastewater treatment plant in 
Gorna Oriahovitza, which project price was 17 million. Euros, and that plant was 
resized.[8]     
Second, opportunities for corruption after shifting the accent to maximum 
absorption of the EU funds. With the example of resizing the public infrastructure was 
illustrated the shifting of the focus on running up the necessary sums for projects 
fulfillment. In this way the potential number of people serviced from the local 
population by construction of a water waste treatment plant is increased in order the 
total sum for the public procurement and respectively the commission for the 
executive to be enhanced. In this way most of the public procurements are fulfilled by 
exact groups of big companies because small and medium enterprises are incapable 
of constructing such huge objects. This hinders fair competition and public interest of 
achieving the optimal fulfillment price of the project. For example, in the end of 2015 
the government stopped public procurements for over 1 billion. Euros because of 
suspected irregularities and grouping of ownership of executing companies of large 
infrastructure public procurements.[9]     
 
B. Value Architecture 
This issue is in details examined by the author in his previous publication (Sht. 
Nozharov, 2014).[5] In this regard, only the main concepts will be abstracted in order 
their significance to be taken into account in the current study: 
First of all, this is the inefficient architecture of the organization’ structure.  
The structure of Bulgarian administration, occupied with the EU funds 
absorption is ineffectively organized in many individual operational programmes, 
managed by the relative authorities of the Bulgarian ministries and coordinated by 
the Central Coordination Department at Council of Ministers whose main role is 
coordinating, not decision-making. This structure is dispersed and manages the 
same types of programmes in different way and with different effectiveness, which 
causes many functions and occupations to be duplicated as well as leads to budget 
costs increase. The main conclusions of the aforementioned publication of the author 
are that it will be better only two managing authorities to be differentiated for all 
operational programmes in Bulgaria. One for the infrastructural programmes 
(Environment, Transport, Regional Development) and the other for the non-
investment programmes (Science, Better Management and etc.) which to be situated 
at the Council of Ministers or at the Ministry of the programme with the best results. 
The previous Managing authorities must be transformed into intermediate units of the 
new Managing authorities while at the same time their functions are free of 
outsourced functions in order no duplication of government costs to be reported. This 
thesis is proved with the examples of Operational programme “Environment” and 
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Operational programme “Transport. Obviously Operational programme “Environment” 
functions ineffectively in spite of the numerous staff, receiving the same high wages 
as their colleagues in Operational programme “Transport and fulfilling the same 
project types. Moreover, the main activities in this programme are outsourced while 
the staff attends post-graduate courses for hundreds of thousands of Euros for the 
state account even though they are paid double as overqualified professionals.  
Second, it is the inefficient structure and qualification of the staff of the 
organization. Some of the operational programmes (such as Operational programme 
“Environment”) consist of a complex structure with a managing authority and 
intermediate units.[10]   Generally the intermediate unit is not a mandatory structure 
in the European legislation and the member-state or the managing authority decides 
if they need such body. When such units are established, this leads to great number 
of senior executives and complex interconnections among them. The complicated 
hierarchical architecture leads to ineffectiveness, long decision-making processes 
and lack of balance among many interests and qualifications. Very few operational 
programmes have efficient structures. Such is for example Operational programme 
“Transport” which consists only of managing authority. The managing authority 
directly negotiates with the beneficiaries.[11] 
Thirdly, it is the pledged low competence of the staff in the organizational 
structure. The previously cited research of the author proved that:  
- at least one third of the staff in public administration responsible for the EU 
funds absorption for Bulgaria are appointed without competition. This leads to a high 
risk of insufficient recruitment of employees who cover only the minimum 
requirements for the occupation and when competition is held these applicants will 
not be ranked. The most commonly used method for recruitment is reappointment 
from low skilled occupation or replacement of an employee on maternity leave. 
Another way, the competition procedure is bypassed, is to appoint directly part-time 
employee as a senior expert in EU funds. Subsequently the employee is reappointed 
to a full-time job; 
- the assessment of employees responsible for the management and 
absorption of EU funds is unreasonable. According to the information about 
assessment of employees, for the period 2007-2013, approximately half of the staff in 
public administration (47%) responsible for EU funds absorption substantially over 
fulfilled their obligations and the other half of them (55%) fulfilled their duties properly, 
but at the same time the effectiveness of the operational programme is low.  At that 
moment, according to the Brussels Office of the German Society for International 
Cooperation (GIZ), the sum of the really absorbed EU funds by Bulgaria for the 
period 2007г.-2013 (reimbursed from EU funds) at the end of the second quarter of 
2014 is 48%.[12] This means that the capacity of Bulgaria for real absorption of the 
earmarked funds (really reimbursed by EU) is 50%, and if the European Commission 
did not extend the term of the programme period ('N+2 or N+3' rule), Bulgaria would 
suffer significant losses as a result of the inefficient work of these employees who 
have been excellently assessed.  
- the variations in wages of staff responsible for the management of EU funds 
and staff, occupied with the management of national budget with the same 
qualifications and fulfilling the same obligations lead to ineffectiveness of the financial 
processes at public administration. The employees responsible for management of 
the national budget and at the same time assisting the management of the EU funds 
are not motivated as their wages are 5 times lower than those of servants occupied 
with the fulfillment of operational programmes. At the same time their colleagues, 
Nozharov, Shteryo. (2016). Social costs of the inefficient management of the EU funds for Bulgaria.
Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW – Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
5 
 
receiving high wages are also not motivated to work as they rely on the formal and 
unreasonable assessment of their work. In this regard prerequisites for deteriorated 
communications and relations among directorates in relevant ministries and agencies 
are created.   
- the low initial qualification of appointed employees leads to high additional 
government costs for their re-qualification and supporting their work by outsourcing.  
For example, for re-qualification of staff at the Managing authority and at the 
Intermediate Unit of Operational Programme “Environment” only for two years (2012-
2013) are spent half of million Euros. It turns out that in 2012, at the end of the 
programme period, 30% of the staff is taught how to manage EU funds and projects 
as well to assign and monitor public procurements. Here raises the question, how 
these employees performed their obligations during the period 2007-2012. 
The level of language proficiency of the staff responsible for the EU funds in 
Bulgaria is also questioned, although according to the national legislation it is one of 
the requirements for appointment of such kind of experts. It is interesting that for the 
period 2008-2014 for the needs of Operational programme “Environment” 
approximately 200 000 Euros were spent for outsourced translations. 
Having in mind the level of qualification of the staff, there will be examined 
also the share of outsourced activities. While the highly qualified staff of the 
Managing Authority in Operational programme “Environment” continued to be trained 
for half of million per year and at the same time received monthly their high wages, 
most of their duties are outsourced to private companies: 
The Managing Authority of Operational programme “Environment” has 
outsourced the activities on mid-term and running assessments of the operational 
programme, which is its main obligation according to the legislation. Also the 
activities on risk analysis and management of the contracted grants are outsourced 
to private companies and are spent approximately 250 000 Euros.  
The Intermediate Unit of Operational programme „Environment” has also 
outsourced some of its main functions despite they are its obligation according to the 
national legislation. For example, the preliminary and follow up control of the public 
procurements is outsourced to private companies and the sum of the money paid is 
130 000 Euros. The activities, related to monitoring and verification of projects is also 
outsourced and the money paid is 300 000 Euros. The examples are not exhaustive, 
there are many others, but they will not be listed because of the limited volume of the 
study. 
 For the period 2007-2013, in Operational programme „Environment” for staff 
re-qualification and execution of the main functions of the authority are spent more 
than 2 million Euros. 
It is inadmissible, for the same activity which is inefficient to be paid the 
highest rates both for public administration and outsourcing. This outsourcing shows 
that one of the both parties is redundant – either the staff of the public administration 
who do not exercise their obligations, or the private companies which in spite of the 
high commissions they receive, the fulfillment of the projects is not so effective (only 
50%), what is the level of absorption of the EU funds for Bulgaria in the mentioned 
period.  
 
C. Value Network 
This issue is also examined in details in the previous publication of the author 
(Sht.Nozharov, 2014).[5] In this regard, the main conclusions will be abstracted due 
to their significance for the current research: 
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First of all, the interconnections and functional relations are ineffective. 
What is specific for the period 2007-2013 are the problems in the control 
systems? The processes in the follow-up control are duplicated. Executive Agency 
“Audit of the European Union Funds” performs functions in accordance with the 
Internal Audit Law and duplicates the functions of the directorates in internal audit at 
each Ministry with operational programme which also carry out activities in 
accordance with the Internal Audit Law. The systems for preliminary control are also 
duplicated. Such type of control is carried out by the staff in the relevant operational 
programmes and at the same time, preliminary control is exercised by other 
government bodies such as the Public Procurement Agency. The systems for follow-
up control are also duplicated. Such control is carried out by the Supreme Audit 
Institution, by the Public Financial Inspection Agency and by the Prosecutor’s Office 
of the Republic of Bulgaria. At the same time, each operational programme sets 
measures for auditing (in some of the programmes the sum equals 2% of the total 
budget) which in most of the cases are outsourced to private companies.  
The large number of participants in the control systems with duplicate functions 
leads to higher ineligible costs and ineffectiveness. The model needs to be changed. 
Additionally the cumbersome application and execution procedures could be 
examined, as well as the systems for information exchange, the insufficient levels of 
the so-called e-government, discrepancy in the management and control systems of 
the operational programmes and etc.   
Secondly, the inappropriate structured strategic framework outlines wrong 
interconnections in the organizational system which leads to conflicts among the 
participants: 
         As a long-term strategic document in the field of EU funds could be examined 
the National Reform Programme.[13] This programme is complemented and 
specified with various sector strategies in the field of environment, transport, 
agriculture, regional development and etc. The sector strategies do not correspond 
with the administrative structure of the public authorities. For example there are 
various operational programmes where measures for the environment are set: 
environment, transport, agriculture, regional development, which is carried out in 
different way in accordance with the specifics of each operational programme. In 
addition, the environmental policy is examined differently in the strategic documents 
of ministry of economy; ministry of transport, ministry of agriculture, ministry of 
environment and waters. This results in uncoordinated effect of the national budget 
and EU funds and leads to ineffectiveness of value networks.   
 
D. Value Finance 
To March, 1st 2016 Bulgaria reported that 96% of the earmarked EU funds for 
cohesion policy for the country are absorbed.[14]  It covers the period to December 
31st, 2015 which is the reference date after which the funding is stopped.  
The reported percentage for absorption of the EU funds for Bulgaria is incorrect 
because it does not present the real financial value of the analyzed organization.  
In order real results to be achieved, the model of I.Paliova, T.Lybek (2014) will 
be used. [3]   
The main data resources used are: 
- Progress report 2007–2015 (KPMG, 2016) 
- Annual report concerning the strike balance of programmes, co-funded by EU 
funds and of the countries from the European Economic Area for the period 
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2007 – 2013, as well as progress made in the programmes from the period 
2014 – 2020“.[7]     
 
The output data for Bulgaria according to the aforementioned resources are: 
- Available budget of the EU funds: 6.7 billion Euros;  
- Contracted budget: 7.0 billion Euros; 
-Paid grants with the beneficiaries: 6.4 billion Euros; 
-Certified grants: 5.4 billion Euros; 
-contract ratio: 105% 
-payment ratio: 95% 
-certified ratio: 81% 
 
Conclusions:  
First of all, Bulgaria has absorbed 1.2 billion Euros less than the available 
budget of the EU structural and cohesion funds. This happens because of the 
reported frauds and that their amount is bigger than the financial corrections made. 
They are paid by the national budget and in this way result in public social costs. 
Secondly, the Bulgarian state authorities presented incorrect share of EU funds 
absorption (96%) for the period 2007-2015, which corresponds to the paid grants 
with beneficiaries but not to the certified ones by the EC grants (81%). The variations 
of 15% down are a huge deviation. 
Thirdly, it is better to be given an example of the absorption percentage and the 
officially reported percentage of absorption of EU funds in an individual operational 
programme. Having in mind the huge volume of information about the seven 
operational programmes as an example will be taken Operational programme 
“Environment”.  
The output data for Operational programme “Environment” 2007-2013 are the 
following: 
- Total budget for the realization of the programme 1 641 623 150 Euros.   
- National co-funding: 246 243 473 Euros (15%) 
- EU funding: 1 395 379 677 Euros (85%) 
- Reported implementation of the programme: 97% of the absorption of the EU 
funds. [7]     
What is the real percentage of EU funds absorption in Operational programme 
“Environment”? 
To December 31, 2015 the total paid grants to the beneficiaries are 
1 792 220 756 Euros, which is 109,17 % of the Operational programme budget.  
The total verified grants to December 31, 2015 are 1 491 540 142 Euros, which 
is 90,86% of the Operational programme budget.  
The total certified grants to December 31, 2015 are 1 205 458 058 Euros which 
is 73,43 % of the Operational programme budget. 
The financial corrections in Operational programme made to December 21, 
2015 are 97.145 million Euros (97 145 457).  
Calculations and conclusions: 
1. The variations between the operational programme budget and the certified 
grants are 436 165 092 Euros.    
This means that 27% of the Operational programme total budget is uncertified 
grants, related to frauds. 
Nozharov, Shteryo. (2016). Social costs of the inefficient management of the EU funds for Bulgaria.
Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW – Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
8 
 
2. The variations between the uncertified grants in Operational programme 
“Environment” and the financial corrections made are 339 019 635 Euros, which 
is 20% of the operational programme total budget. 
According to the calculations made, the reported figure of 97% of EU funds 
absorption by the Ministry of environment and waters is incorrect. The real one is 
15% lower - 72% .   
 
2. Identification of the social costs, caused by the inefficient EU funds 
management and absorption for Bulgaria  
When analyzing this issue, first of all the term “inefficiency of EU funds 
management and absorption” must be defined. In this aspect two individual elements 
which are correlated to each other, could be examined: 
- Quantitative inefficiency – as a result of the lower level of EU funds 
absorption, and 
- Qualitative inefficiency – as a result of the low quality of the provided public 
goods, expected to be constructed by EU funds.  
In the first case, the quantitative inefficiency could be calculated in currency in 
accordance with the presented model in the previous chapter of the study by 
comparing the planned, contracted, paid and certified ratio of the EU grants.   
In the second case, the qualitative inefficiency could be calculated by the 
decreased number of public infrastructure sites (e.g. less waste depots) or by the 
number of insufficiently working public infrastructure facilities (e.g. the resized waste 
water treatment plant in Gorna Oriahovitza, which was mentioned in the previous 
chapter of the research).  
Both types of inefficiency could be measured quantitatively, but in the second 
case, the quantitatively measurement will not give full picture of the damage endured 
by the society. In this regard, the initial quantitative assessment of this type of 
inefficiency is not complete and could be complemented with the qualitative losses 
for the society. That is why; it is defined as quantitative inefficiency.  
Defining the term “inefficiency” of EU funds management and absorption is a 
prerequisite for the determination of social costs, caused by this inefficiency.  
The inefficiency (loss of social welfare) in this case will be caused by: 
- Inefficient government policy (leading to inefficient architecture of the EU funds 
management and absorption structures);  
- Illegal or incompetent behavior of public administration staff, who work 
inefficiently in this field (due to insufficient control or bad system for recruitment 
of the personnel); 
- Lack of public control also leads to inefficiency (because of the complexity of 
the matter and low knowledge of citizens in this issues); 
- Inefficient intervention of the European Commission for public awareness in the 
member-states for the real level of EU funds absorption (lack of public 
information about the certified ratio of the absorbed grants); 
- Selfish actions of private companies which want to maximize their profit 
through inefficient implementation of the projects and spending money for 
expensive media campaigns for misinterpretation of the public opinion; 
 
Having in mind the aforementioned, the “social costs of the EU funds 
management and absorption” could be determined as a function of its quantitative 
and qualitative inefficiency as well as the reasons for it.  
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That is why, „social costs of the EU funds management and absorption“ 
will be defined as: 
- lower level of absorption of the grants from EU cohesion funds; 
- provision of public goods with lower quality which will be produced by EU 
funds; 
- infringements by EC for the not fully constructed public infrastructure; 
- lack of convergence, measured by the GDP per capita for the period of EU 
funding. As another indicator could be used the decreasing number of 
immigrants to EU member states with average or high GDP per capita; 
- reallocation of national budget resources from areas which are under the 
jurisdiction of the national governments to areas entirely funded by EU 
funds, which  leads to low provision of the relative public goods; 
- increase taxes and fiscal burden because of the filling of the budget 
deficits, caused by the uncertified EU grants and the necessity of higher 
share of the national funding;  
- increased budget expenditures to provide the inefficient public 
administration responsible for the management of EU funds; 
- unfair competition among companies, caused by the poor control in 
funding projects with EU funds in order some companies to conquer huge 
market shares, based on corruption practices; 
- missed opportunities in direct foreign investments as a result of the not 
fully constructed public infrastructure (respectively less jobs and less 
paid taxes to the budget); 
 
The so determined “social costs of the EU funds management and absorption” 
could be measured by different approaches: 
The first hypothesis, concerning the lower level of EU funds absorption, 
could be measured by comparing the planned, contracted, paid and certified EU 
grants and taking into consideration the sum of the uncertified EU grants as well as 
the financial corrections made by the Managing Authorities to the beneficiaries.  
At national level, this sum was mentioned in the previous chapter and for the 
period 2007-2015, it was 1.2 billion Euros. Taking into consideration that the correct 
period is 2007-2013, because in 2014 started the new programme period (2014-
2020), which has its own financial resources, the direct annual financial loss for the 
society because of unabsorbed EU grants is 200 million Euros per year. 
The second hypothesis concerning the provision of public goods with 
lower quality could be measured by the sum of the first hypothesis (1.2 billion. 
Euros).This sum could be sufficient for the construction of the entire missing 
infrastructure in Bulgaria in the field of environment and waters protection. In this way 
the citizens will receive public goods with better quality.  
The third hypothesis, concerning the infringements by EC for not fully 
constructed infrastructure could be measured by the sum of the total 
infringements, caused by this inefficiency. For example, because of the inefficient 
absorption of the EU funds in the field of environment, Bulgarian government has not 
constructed the public infrastructure for waste management and treatments and 
because of that is given to Court by the European Commission.[15] It is possible a 
serious penalty to be levied to our country which in this case will be the social costs 
of the inefficient management of the EU funds for environment. 
The fourth hypothesis, concerning the lack of convergence could be 
measured by the potential for increasing the values of GDP per capita during the 
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period of EU funding. For example, for the period 2007-2015, according to the 
EUROSTAT database, the economic growth of Bulgaria, compared to that of 
Romania is 30% slower.[16] This means that the reported absorption of EU funds of 
96% is incorrect or the constructed public infrastructure is with low quality and does 
not lead to the necessary economic growth and living standards for the society. In 
addition, the number of permanently migrating Bulgarians to member states with 
average or high GDP per capita means that they do not see real effect of the EU 
funds absorption.  
Fifth hypothesis, concerning the reallocation of national budget resources 
from areas which are under the jurisdiction of the national governments to 
areas entirely funded by EU funds, could be measured by decreasing the volume 
of financial resources for public services funding. If we take the calculated sum of 
inefficiency of 200 million Euros per year for the period 2007-2015 then this sum 
could be successfully used for funding of the health system in Bulgaria. It could be 
hypothetically accepted that these financial resources are reallocated for filling the 
deficits, caused by the ineligible costs, i.e. by the inefficient EU funds management.  
Sixth hypothesis, concerning increased taxes and fiscal burden because 
of the filling of the budget deficits, caused by the uncertified EU grants and the 
necessity of higher share of the national funding, could be measured by the sum 
of the first hypothesis (1.2 billion Euros) and as a result of the classic tax multiplier 
The social cost will be determined by the distortions of the business cycles or not 
achieving the planned economic growth.  
Seventh hypothesis, concerning the increased budget expenditures to 
provide the inefficient public administration responsible for the management of 
EU funds, could be measured by the increased cost control (more internal auditors, 
inspectors, experts in preliminary control, external auditors, various specialized 
departments for control in the Supreme Audit Institution and etc.). This will indicate 
that the main departments do not function efficiently and the complex control 
structure will also lead to inefficiency.  
Eight hypothesis, concerning unfair competition among companies, 
caused by the poor control in funding projects with EU funds in order some 
companies to conquer huge market shares, based on corruption practices 
could be measured by the increase number of cases at the Commission for 
competitiveness protection, related to the market power of companies which gain 
public procurements funded by EU funds and there are many claims against them for 
inefficient implementation of the projects, which is a signal for corruption practices 
and influence peddling.  
Ninth hypothesis, concerning missed opportunities in direct foreign 
investments as a result of the not fully constructed public infrastructure could 
be measured by the variations between the planned growth rate of the direct foreign 
investments as a result of the fully constructed public infrastructure by EU funds and 
their real rate. For example, some strategic investors preferred investing their 
financial resources in Romania rather than in Bulgaria, where the public infrastructure 
is much more efficient.  
 
Conclusions 
The current study achieved two main goals. Firstly it proved that V4 BM model 
of Al-Debei and Avison (2010) could be successfully applied in the public sector, also 
in the field of EU funds management and absorption for the cohesion policy. Through 
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this model are identified the weaknesses of the national strategic frame and 
measures for their development are proposed.  
Secondly, the real level of EU funds absorption for Bulgaria was identified to be 
with 15% lower that the reported level by the government, which is a huge deviation. 
On third place, the social costs, caused by the inefficient EU funds management 
and absorption for Bulgaria, are defined.  
On fourth place, a conceptual model for measurement of the identified and 
defined social costs caused by the inefficient EU funds management and absorption 
for Bulgaria, is presented.  
In spite of the presented statistical data and calculations of the social costs, a 
complete statistical analysis is not made.  
The main objective of the current study is to identify and define the social costs 
caused by the inefficient EU funds management and absorption for Bulgaria in order 
to be supported the work of the public authorities for society awareness and 
increased public control.  
Even conceptually defined high social costs caused by the inefficiency in this 
field, the public interest and control in Bulgaria are too low and formal. This leads to 
taxpayer’s losses from other member-states caused by the migration flows, as a 
result of the lack of convergence and cohesion.  
On fifth place, the current study contributes to development of the model for 
assessment and control of the operational programmes, which could be used by the 
European Commission offices.  
The main objective of the research does not have to be accepted as maximum 
EU funds absorption, but as an opportunity efficient public services to be provided 
and construction of qualitative public infrastructure to be achieved. The EU funds 
absorption must be oriented towards better living standards of the society and 
competitiveness of the national economy in order cohesion and convergence to be 
achieved. 
The failure and inefficient EU funds absorption in Bulgaria could discourage 
countries like FYROM, Turkey and Serbia in their ambition to become EU member-
states. This could be perceived as a serious reason for deepening the researches in 
the field of efficient EU funds absorption and management.  
The current study is only a concept for identification and measurement of the 
social costs, caused by the inefficient EU funds management and absorption and if it 
could raise discussion on this topic, it will be of great public interest.   
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